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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and RANDY
COOMBS FORBES, individually and
as guardians and natural parents
Of NICOLE LYNN FORBES,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,
vs.

Supreme Court No. 20713

ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah
corporation, DON VanSTREETER,M.D.,
TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M.D., and
JOHN DOES 1 through 20,
Defendants/Respondents.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT, ST. MARK'S HOSPITAL

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
This Respondent concurs in the statement made by the
Appellant.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This Respondent concurs in the Statement of the Case,
including the Statement of Facts as given in Appellant's Brief
and, consequently, does not repeat the same here pursuant to Rule
24(b), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
St. Mark's Hospital argues that a correct application
of the rules of construction of the statutes concerned leads to
the conclusion
statute

of

that this action

limitations.

is barred

Specifically,

by the applicable

the

intent

of

the

legislature was to bar actions absolutely after four years from
the date of the incident concerned with some limited exception.
The construction of the statutes concerned by the District Court
promotes the policies of allowing

a reasonable

time

for the

plaintiffs to act while reasonably limiting the time for such
actions

to

be

brought

for

the

protection

of

health

care

providers.

ARGUMENT
I.
INTRODUCTION
At issue in this appeal is the interaction of §78-14-4
and §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953, as amended), in establishing a limitations period for medical negligence actions.

It

is clear that §78-14-4 provides that the action must be brought
within two years of discovery of the injury "but not to exceed
four years after the alleged act of negligence."
-2-

A

problem

arises because

§78-14-8

requires

that a

Notice of Intent to commence an action must be served at least
ninety (90) days prior to the filing of a suit.

The statute

provides that if the Notice is served with less than 90 days left
on "the applicable time period" that the time for filing an
action is extended

120 days from the date of service of the

Notice,
Plaintiffs served their Notice of Intent one (1) day
before the two years after discovery period ran and 101 days
prior to the running of the 4-year limitation period.

Their suit

was filed 113 days after the Notice to Commence Action was served
and 12 days after the 4-year limitation period ran.
Plaintiffs attempt to put at issue the phrase in §7814—8r which refers to the "applicable time period".
tiffs contend

that the applicable

time period

The plain-

is the 2-year

limitations period which, when the 120 days is added, would allow
them to file suit after the 4-year period has run.
This Respondent asserts that the Court need not be
particularly concerned with determining the meaning of the phrase
"applicable time period".

What the District Court placed at

issue with its decision is whether the limitations statutes cut
off a claim at 4 years even though the plaintiffs were within a
120 day extension upon the two-year period.
-3-

The choices available to the Court for resolution of
this action are:
A.
year

period

The 120 day extension may be added to the two-

and

allowed

to

extend

beyond

the

four-year

1 imitations period.
B.

The

120 day extension only applies to those

plaintiffs which file with less than 90 days left on the fouryear period and is not added to the two-year limitation period as
not being the "applicable time period".
C.

The 120 day extension may be added to either the

two-year or four-year limitations periods but an extension on the
two-year period may not extend beyond the four-year limitations
period.
The appellants have taken the position stated
above.
B.

in A,

It is believed the other respondents address position

This respondent supports the resolution stated in C.
If the 2-year limitations period with an additional 120

days

is allowed

to exceed

the 4-year limitations period, as

Appellant claims, the plain language of §78-14-4, to the effect
that no action is to exceed 4 years from the date of the incident
must be ignored.

Recognizing that this plain language must be

given effect, the District Court found that the action must be

-4-

filed before the 4-year period ran where the Notice of Intent is
served more than 90 days prior to the running of the 4-year
period,

II.
APPLICABLE RULES OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
A.

INTRODUCTION
Any of the three resolutions available to the Court

identified

above arise from and will result in some conflict

between the actual language of §78-14-4 and §78-14-8 under the
facts of this case.

If the Appellant's position is adopted, the

language of §78-14-4 limiting all actions to four years will
remain in conflict.

Conversely, if this Respondent's position is

adopted, the 120 day extension provided
limited
days.

to the four-year period

in §78-14-8 will be

and will not be a full 120

Consequently, this Court must determine which of these

choices is the better resolution.
Certain established rules exist

to assist in harmoniz-

ing statutes which appear to be in conflict.

Those rules will

assist this Court in resolving whether §78-14-8 should be allowed
to create an exception to the rule of §78-14-4 which limits these
malpractice actions to four years.
-5-

B.

RULES OF CONSTRUCTION
The Utah Code provides its own fundamental rule of

construction in §68-3-2.

(See Appendix for complete text)

That

statute provides for liberal construction of the statutes "to
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote justice".
A similar rule of construction developed out of case
law from this Court.

The Court has stated that its "primary

responsibility" in construing legislation is to give an effect to
legislative intent.
(Utah

1984).

A

American Coal Co. v. Sandstrom, 689 P.2d 1
similar

concern

was expressed

in Board of

Education of Granite School District v. Salt Lake City, 659 P.2d
• • • • • • • • • • • •
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1030 (Utah 1983)^ when the Court considered the construction of
tax collection statutes and stated that the "fundamental consideration was legislative intent".
Another

important

rule of construction

is found in

Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1983)r wherein the Court
considered statutes apparently in conflict and applied the rule
that statutes should be harmonized so far as possible.
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III.
UNDER THE APPLICABLE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION,
THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The legislative intent in adopting §78-14-4 and §78-148 is not difficult to discern because of the express statement of
intent found in §78-14-2.

See Appendix for text.

Specifically/

the Legislature expressed a concern over the number of lawsuits
against

health

care

providers

and

the

resulting

cost

of

malpractice insurance which ultimately reduces the availability
of medical

services

to the

citizens

of Utah.

The statute

identifies certain purposes to be accomplished by the Utah Health
Care

Malpractice

part.

Those

Act, of

purposes

which

include

the
that

limitation
injured

statutes are

parties have a

reasonable time to commence an action while limiting that time to
specific periods to enable health care providers to reasonably
calculate and anticipate tort exposure.
Other governing principles ought to be considered in
construing the statutes.

First, in regulating health care mat-

ters, the Legislature is acting under its police power to protect
the public health and welfare.

Consequently, construction should

be liberally made toward the purposes expressed.

See, Stone v.

Department of Registration, 567 P. 2d 1115 (Utah 1977).

Second,

the purpose of the Notice of Intent requirement is to give the
-7-

parties an opportunity to discuss and resolve the potential claim
in order to avoid unnecessary expensive litigation.

Behrens v.

Raleigh Hills Hospital, 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 1983).
In light of the rules of construction, the legislative
intent, and the applicable purposes to be accomplished by the
Utah Health Care Malpractice Act, the better construction of §7814-4 and §78-14-8 is that the 120 day extension added to a twoyear

limitation

period

is cut off by

the 4-year limitation

period.
That the 4-year limitation period cuts off the 120 day
extension added to a 2-year period is the better view is shown by
the accomplishment of several things.

First, the express lan-

guage of §78-14-4 stating that actions are to be filed within
four years is fully applied.
limit actions is met.

Second, the intent to reasonably

The plaintiffs had a reasonable opportun-

ity (two years and 101 days) to file their action.

The purpose

of having sufficient time to discuss and resolve the claim has
been accomplished.

Third, conflict between the two statutes is

minimized because no new exception to the rule of filing within
four years is created.
Recognition of cutting off the 120 day extension added
to the 2-year limitations period at the 4-year limitations creates only a very limited exception to the 120 day rule expressed
-8-

in §78-14-8,

No abrogation of the intent of the statutes to

provide a reasonable time for filing the suit while balancing the
need of health care providers to be protected occurs.
Recognition of the plaintiffs' position that the 120
day period added to the 2-year limitation can extend beyond the
4-year limitation

is a construction

reasonably limit these actions.

away

from the intent to

The effect would be to create a

new exception for all cases which had the 2-year after discovery
period end during the time period of 120 to 91 days before the 4year period ended.
It is important to keep in mind when considering a
limitations problem that at issue is the end of the opportunity
to litigate a question.
file their action.

Plaintiffs had two years and 101 days to

Therefore, the enforcement of the 4-year

limitations period works no injustice because of the reasonable
opportunity to act.
Appellants suggest a hypothetical situation in their
Brief which is alleged to demonstrate the injustice worked by the
District Court's ruling.

See Appellant's Brief, p. 9.

There

will always be some unusual circumstances to consider when the
law engages in line drawing.

No statute can fully and adequately

anticipate all circumstances which may arise.
the construction

suggested

For example, under

by the plaintiffs, if a plaintiff

-9-

served a Notice of Intent 91 days before the 2-year period ran,
only one day would be available to file the action.

Under the

construction proposed by this defendant, an additional 1D1 days
was available.
Rather than engage in the consideration of hypothetical
evils, this Court need consider only the facts of this case and
weigh the relative competing interests of the parties in light of
the

rules

of

construction.

reasonable opportunity

Again,

to bring

the

plaintiffs

had

a

their suit before the 4-year

period ran and the public policies legitimately expressed by the
Legislature

are

fulfilled

by

the

defendants

proposed

construction.

CONCLUSION
Under either the Appellants1 or the Respondent's arguments, this Court must choose between some resulting inconsistencies in the language of the statutes concerned.

The Appellants

would have the Court create an exception to the absolute language
of §78-14-4 that malpractice actions are not to extend beyond
four years after the date of the incident giving rise to the
claim.

The Respondent's argument contained herein would have the

Court limit the 120 day extension of the 2-year period to a

-10-

maximum of the 4-year limitations period.

The decision of the

District Court to strictly apply the 4-year rule is the better
view because it allows the plaintiffs to have had a reasonable
time after discovery of the injury to file their suit while
promoting the policies sought to be implemented by the statutes
concerned.

The Judgment of the District Court was, therefore,

reasonable in light of the total picture of fact and applicable
law.

The District Court should be affirmed.
DATED this 30th day of September, 1985.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C.

ARMAN E. KIPP//

GREGoS?7/. SANDERS
Attorneys for Respondent
St. Markfs Hospital
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four copies of the foregoing
Brief of Respondent, St. Mark's Hospital, were served on each of
the below named parties on the 30th day of Se^tenrfcreTr, 1985, by
depositing them in the U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to the following :
Bryan L. McDougal, Esq.
Suite 735, Judge Building
8 East Broadway
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorney for Plaintiffs-Appellants
P. Keith Nelson, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Toshiko Toyota, M.D.
Stewart M. Hanson, Jr., Esq.
Francis J. Carney, Esq.
SUITTER, AXLAND, ARMSTRONG & HANSON
175 South West Temple, Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
Don VanStreeter, M.D.

APPENDIX

68-3-2. Statutes in derogation of common law liberally construed—
Rules of equity prevail.—The rule of the common law that statutes in
derogation thereof are to be strictly construed has no application to the
statutes of this state. The statutes establish the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which they relate, and their provisions and all
proceedings under them are to be liberally construed with a view to effect
the objects of the statutes and to promote justice. Whenever there is
any variance between the rules of equity and the rules of common law
in reference to the same matter the rules of equity shall prevail.
78-14-2. Legislative findings and declarations—Purpose of act.—The
legislature finds and declares that the number of suits and claims for damages and the amount of judgments and settlements arising from health care
has increased greatly in recent years. Because of these increases the insurance industry has substantially increased the cost of medical malpractice
insurance. The effect of increased insurance premiums and increased claims
is increased care cost, both through the health care providers passing the
cost of premiums to the patient and through the provider's practicing defensive medicine because he views a patient as a potential adversary in a
lawsuit. Further,, certain health care providers are discouraged from continuing to provide services because of the high cost and possible unavailability of malpractice insurance.
In view of these recent trends and with the intention of alleviating the
adverse effects which these trends are producing in the public's health care
system, it is necessary to protect the public interest by enacting measures
designed to encourage private insurance companies to continue to provide
health-related malpractice insurance while at the same time establishing a
mechanism to ensure the availability of insurance in the event that it becomes unavailable from private companies.
In enacting this act, it is the purpose of the legislature to provide a
reasonable time in which actions may be commenced against health care
providers while limiting that time to a specific period for which professional liability insurance premiums can be reasonably and accurately calculated ; and to provide other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation and settlement of claims.
78-14-4. Statute of limitations — Exceptions — Application. (1) No malpractice action against a health care provider may be brought unless it is commenced within two years after the plaintiff or patient discovers, or through the
use of reasonable diligence should have discovered the injury, whichever first
occurs, but not to exceed four years after the date of the alleged act, omission,
neglect or occurrence, except that
(a) In an action where the allegation against the health care provider is that
a foreign object has been wrongfully left within a patient's body, the claim shall
be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or patient discovers,
or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the existence
of the foreign object wrongfully left in the patient's body, whichever first occurs;
and
(b) In an action where it is alleged that a patient has been prevented from discovering misconduct on the part of a health care provider because that health care
provider has affirmatively acted to fraudulently conceal the alleged misconduct, the
claim shall be barred unless commenced within one year after the plaintiff or
patient discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence, should have discovered the fraudulent concealment, whichever first occurs.
(2) The provisions of this section shall apply to all persons, regardless of minority or other legal disability under section 78-12-36 or any other provision of the
law, and shall apply retroactively to all persons, partnerships, associations and corporations and to all health care providers and to all malpractice actions against
health care providers based upon alleged personal injuries which occurred prior
to the effective date of this act; provided, however, that any action which under
former law could have been commenced after the effective date of this act may
be commenced only within the unelapsed portion of time allowed under former law;
but any action which under former law could have been commenced more than four
years after the effective date of this act may be commenced only within four years
after the effective date of this act.

78-14-8, Notice of intent to commence action. No malpractice action against
a health care provider may be initiated unless and until the plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or his executor or successor, at least ninety days' prior notice
of intent to commence an action. Such notice shall include a general statement of
the nature of the claim, the persons involved, the date, time and place of the occurrence, the circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct on the part of
the prospective defendant, the nature of the alleged injuries and other damages
sustained. Notice may be in letter or affidavit form executed by the plaintiff or
his attorney. Service shall be accomplished by persons authorized and in the manner prescribed by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure for the service of the summons
and complaint in a civil action or by certified mail, return receipt requested, in
which case notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date of mailing. Such
notice shall be served within the time allowed for commencing a malpractice action
against a health care provider. If the notice is served less than ninety days prior
to the expiration of the applicable time period, the time for commencing the malpractice action against the health care provider shall be extended to 120 days from
the date of service of notice.
This section shall, for purposes of determining its retroactivity, not be construed
as relating to the limitation on the time for commencing any action, and shall
apply only to causes of action arising on or after April 1, 1976. This section shall
not apply to third party actions, counterclaims or crossclaims against a health care
provider.

Stewart M. Hanson, Jr•, Esq, (1356)
Francis J. Carney, Esq. (0581)
SUITTER AXLAND ARMSTRONG &
HANSON
175 South West Temple
Seventh Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1480
Telephone: (801) 532-7300
Attorneys for Defendant
Don Van Steeter, M. D.

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and
RANDY COOMBS FORBES individually and as guardians
and natural parents of
NICOLE LYNN FORBES,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
-vsST, MARK'S HOSPITAL, a Utah
corporation, DON VAN STEETER,
M. D w TOSHIKO TOYOTA, M* D* ,
and JOHN DOES 1 through 20,

HON. JAMES S. SAWAYA
Civil No. C-85-1531

Defendants.

This matter has come on for hearing before the Court,
Honorable Dean E. Conder presiding by designation, on April
29, 1985, on defendants' motions to dismiss or for summary judgment

on t h e g r o u n d

that

this

action

was barred

by § 7 3 - 1 4 - 4 ,

Utah

Code Ann. (1953, as amended.)
Plaintiffs
E s q . ; defendant

were

represented

Van S t e e t e r

by S t e w a r t

by Bryan

L.

M. H a n s o n ,

McDougal,
Jr.,

Esq.;

defendant S t . Mark's H o s p i t a l by Gregory J . S a n d e r s , Esq. ; d e f e n d a n t
Toyota by P. Keith N e l s o n ,
The

Court,

having

reviewed the r e s p e c t i v e
parties,

entered

motions on A p r i l

its
30,

Esq.
heard

memoranda

the

arguments

submitted

of

on b e h a l f

Memorandum D e c i s i o n g r a n t i n g
1985, and being o t h e r w i s e

counsel,
of

the

defendants1

advised

in

the

p r e m i s e s , now e n t e r s i t s Judgment as f o l l o w s :
I t i s hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDJED AND DECREED that judgment shall
be, and hereby is, entered in favor of all defendants and against
plaintiff, no cause of action.

MADE AND ENTERED this

day of May, 1985.

BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE DEAN E. CONDER
District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I
was

served

hereby
this

certify
-J-

t h a t a copy of

day

of

t h e U. S. M a i l , p o s t a g e p r e p a i d ,

May,

the

1985,

foregoing

by d e p o s i t i n g

to:

BRYAN L. McDOUGAL, ESQ.
A t t o r n e y for P l a i n t i f f s
2 61 E a s t Broadway
S u i t e #150
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
Carman E. K i p p , E s q .
Gregory J . S a n d e r s , Esq.
KIPP & CHRISTIAN, P . C.
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
S t . Mark's Hospital
3 2 Exchange P l a c e
S u i t e #600
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84111
P. Keith Nelson, Esq.
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER &
NELSON
A t t o r n e y s for Defendant
T o s h i k o T o y o t a , M. D.
50 S o u t h Main
S u i t e #700
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah
84144
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Judgment

C*""*/

it

in

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
CHRIS SORENSON FORBES and
RANDY COOMBS FORBES, individually and as guardians and
natural parents of NICHOLE
LYNN FORBES,

:
:
:

Plaintiffs,
vs.

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

CIVIL NO. C 85-1531

ST. MARKS1S HOSPITAL, a Utah
corporation, DONALD VAN
STREETER, M.D., TOSHIKO TOYOTA, :
M.D., and JOHN DOES 1 through
20,
Defendants.
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Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and the case dismissed.

Dated this

^ &

day of April, 1985.

DEAN E. CONDER
DISTRICT JUDGE
Copies mailed to counsel

